Propaganda and Disinformation in the Russian Federation’s Historical Policy Towards Poland and Ukraine, by the Janusz Kurtyka Foundation

(For professors, college students, and interested adults.) This report by the Janusz Kurtyka Foundation presents Russian propaganda and disinformation based on publications in Russian and pro-Russian internet portals in 2023. The publications cited are products of the Russian Federation’s historical policy, which seeks to undermine relations between Poland and Ukraine by distorting their respective histories, as well as to damage Poland’s relations with other countries by employing the same line of attack. The report can be downloaded as a PDF at this link

As pointed out in the Report’s Introduction, “In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation paid little attention to history in its domestic policy, focusing instead on overcoming the political and economic crisis. However, it quickly became one of the most important elements of national consciousness, used for political purposes by transforming issues concerning the past into a national security problem. Historical policy has become one of the most important elements of the Kremlin’s strategy to overcome the identity crisis in Russia after the collapse of the USSR.”

Section I, Russian Historical Policy Towards Poland and Ukraine, among other important facts, reveals that “According to a [Poland’s] National Security Bureau analysis of Russian historical propaganda from 2004– 2009, the Kremlin has been taking steps to undermine the Polish narrative about the events of the last World War. This trend has been evident since the beginning of the rule of V. Putin, who began to see it as a tool to consolidate his own society by resurrecting the state’s myth of greatness and imperialism. In pursuit of this, Russia began to emphasize the proud national successes of the past, mythologizing the ‘Great Patriotic War’ and the role of the Red Army in the victory over the Third Reich.”

Section II, Polish-Ukrainian Forum for Counteracting Russian Disinformation in the Area of Polish and Ukrainian History, examines the efforts of the bilateral forum established by Poland and Ukraine to invalidate the fabrications of Russian historical policy. Three Tables (panels), composed of 12 historical researchers, were established to assess Russian disinformation.

Table I, The Long Term (Medieval and Modern), shows that “Statements by Russian politicians unequivocally confirm that the Kremlin’s historical policy toward Poland and Ukraine refers not only to events of the last two centuries, but also to the times of the ancient Middle Ages and the modern period. As the experts invited to the Forum pointed out, it is often based on myths or insufficiently verified theses portraying the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in a negative light or denying Ukraine’s separateness from the state of the tsars, taken from 19th-century Russian historiography.”

Table II, A Century of Nations (19th Century), explains that “In Russian historical policy, one can find numerous references to the events of the 19th century. This is particularly noticeable in the context of its presentation of the national identity of Ukrainians, solidifying in the second half of this century.” This effort to erase the Ukrainian national identity is also used today. “With the Russian-Ukrainian conflict ongoing since 2014, the Kremlin has begun to seek in its propaganda to challenge Ukraine’s existence as a state. Among other things, historical arguments are used for this purpose, proving that its lands are an immanent part of Rus understood as Russia.”

Table III, In the Face of Totalitarianisms (20th Century), examines the First and Second World Wars, the latter of which is considered by many historians as the most destructive in all of history. According to the panel, “The twentieth century, due to the tragic events of two world wars, is a key period for the historical memory of most European countries. It is no different for Russia emphasizing the key role of the USSR in the victory over the Third Reich, Ukraine striving for independence and the Polish state, reborn after 123 years of partitions, which lost parts of its territory and sovereignty as a consequence of the 1939-1945 conflict. The difficult past and the animosities dividing Poles and Ukrainians are not forgotten by Russian propaganda, which, in connection with the war in Ukraine and the support given to Kiev by Poland, tries to prevent rapprochement between the two nations by referring to the ‘demons of the past.’”

Section III, Truths, Half-Truths and Untruths. The History of Poland and Ukraine in the Light of Russian and Pro-Russian Online Media in 2023, “… contains a list of selected information about the history of Poland and Ukraine that appeared in Russian and pro-Russian Internet portals in 2023. These excerpts were divided into several groups, based on their content. This makes it possible to clearly observe the strategy of the Kremlin’s historical policy towards Warsaw and Kiev, and to note areas where manipulated or distorted messages are particularly frequent.”

In the first group of excerpts, Polish-Russian Relations, most references are made to the 19th and 20th centuries, “… with emphasis on the benefits Poland obtained from Russia or the USSR, primarily the inclusion of the so-called Recovered Territories within its borders. In this aspect, there is a clearly visible manipulation of facts in order to portray Poles as ungrateful, underestimating the goodwill of the Russians and their contribution to Poland’s development. It is worth quoting the most common hypocritical claims of the Kremlin’s historical policy.” As an example, we read that “Poland’s aggressive policy during the interwar period ended with the loss of its independence following the 1939 aggression of the Third Reich. Its sovereignty and statehood, however, were restored thanks to the USSR.”

In the second group of excerpts, Poland’s Relations with Other Countries, we read that “Russian propaganda, referring to Poland’s relations with other countries, accentuates the issue of Poland’s failure to maintain agreements with its allies and raises the issue of alleged concerns about Germany’s demand for border revision.” As an example, “Poles today want to maintain close relations with Americans for fear of Germans, who may claim East Prussia in the future, which was the cradle of their country’s unification in 1871.”

In the third group of excerpts, Showing Poland as an Extremely Authoritarian and Aggressive State Oppressing National Minorities and Seeking to Expand Its Territory, we read that “Russian propaganda attempts to portray Poland as a state that has shown expansionist inclinations in its history and has discriminated against and oppressed ethnic minorities. In doing so, the alleged anti-Semitism and Russophobia of the Poles is emphasized.” As an example, “The international ambitions of the Second Republic and its claims to dominance in Eastern Europe led to the country’s collapse at the beginning of World War II and its reduction to a bargaining chip in the great powers’ game.”

In the fourth group of excerpts, Poland as an Ally of the Third Reich, “Russia is trying to demolish the image of Poland as a victim of World War II by portraying it as an ally of Germany.” As an example, “The USSR allowed the possibility of intervening to defend Czechoslovakia against the aggressive inclinations of the Third Reich in 1938, but Poland prevented this intervention by refusing to allow the Red Army to march through its territory. Poles planned to cooperate with the Germans against the USSR and to divide it with them.”

In the fifth group of excerpts, Polish Complexes and Dreams of Returning to Former Power, we read that “Russians portray Poles as a nation gripped by megalomania and a past power complex. These opinions are meant to hurt the image of the Republic on the one hand, and on the other to warn Ukrainians and Belarusians of Poles’ alleged expansionist inclinations.” As an example, “Poles are a nation driven by nationalistic megalomania, fondling past greatness, and dreaming of regional leadership. Polish Russophobia is the result of complexes and neuroses related to the partitions of the Commonwealth in the late 18th century.”

In the sixth group of excerpts, Criticism of the Policy Pursued by the Polish State, “Russians are attempting to portray Poland as an immature country without an elite that can conduct an effective international policy.” As an example, “Instead of blaming and insulting their neighbors, Poles should recognize that the main culprits of their historical troubles and today’s difficulties are not ‘cruel Germans’, ‘treacherous Russians’, ‘ungrateful French’, ‘treacherous British and Americans’, ‘godless Eurocrats’, but their own incompetent elites, sometimes leading people to tragedy.”

In the seventh group of excerpts, Polish History, “Russians focus their propaganda primarily on the World War II period, attempting to emphasize the role of the USSR in the ‘liberation’ of Europe from Nazism. This narrative is hindered by the Polish vision of history, which emphasizes the consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the crime committed by the Soviets at Katyn. As an example, “The narrative that the Partition of the Second Polish Republic was carried out by the Third Reich and the USSR is pure demagoguery, since the lands of Belarus and Ukraine, seized by the Red Army on September 17, 1939, had de facto always been Russian, and the Poles occupied them in 1920, disregarding the fact that their compatriots were a minority there.”

In the eighth group of excerpts, Russian-Ukrainian Relations Throughout History, “The Russians refer in their propaganda to Ukraine’s ties to their state, primarily emphasizing that it owes the shape of its borders and industrialization to the USSR.” As an example, “In the mid-19th century, the Ukrainian nation did not yet exist, while the people living in the lands of today’s Ukraine referred to themselves as ‘Ruthenians’ or ‘Malorussians’ and felt part of the ‘Russian world’. The former, residing in Eastern Galicia, were staunch Russophiles at the turn of the 20th century.”

In the ninth group of excerpts, Polish-Ukrainian Relations Throughout History and Their Memory, “The Russians are trying to divide Ukrainians and Poles by referring to the difficult relations between the two nations in the past. On the one hand, they try to remind the former of the policy of oppression carried out by the First and Second Polish Republics in their territory, while on the other hand they emphasize the bestiality and genocidal nature of the Volhynian crime committed by Ukrainians.” As an example, “Despite the passage of time, the Volhynian slaughter remains an ‘unhealed wound’ for Polish society and invariably evokes great emotions in it. Undoubtedly, one of the reasons for this is that for many families it represents a personal experience, the knowledge of which is passed from generation to generation. It will be difficult to have a full agreement between Poles and Ukrainians until Kiev makes certain gestures, and any disputed issues related to the murder are fully clarified. Currently, the Ukrainian authorities deny that genocide against Poles had been committed.”

In the tenth group of excerpts, Cooperation Between Ukrainians and Germans, “Russians emphasize the Ukrainian nationalists’ ties to Germany and portray them as allies of the Third Reich during World War II.” As an example, “Ukrainian nationalists in 1917–1919 destroyed their country and then made it a puppet, handing it over first to Germany and then to Poland. The huge Ukrainian state, the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, in turn, was created by the Bolsheviks.”

In the eleventh group of excerpts, History of Ukraine, “Russian propaganda emphasizes that Ukraine is a young country with a distinct problem in defining its own identity.” As an example, “As a relatively young country, Ukraine is searching for its identity, but it is incomprehensible why it wants to base it on the likes of S. [Stepan] Bandera or R. [Roman] Shukhevych, who are responsible for the murder of 1.5 million Jews.”

The Report ends with two sections titled Applications and Prescriptions. The Applications section summarizes the various ways that Russian historical policy distorts the facts to the detriment of Poland and Ukraine. As an example, “Sentences and opinions appearing in Russian online media on the history of Poland and Ukraine coincide with the message coming from the Kremlin – they duplicate, prove or develop V. [Vladimir] Putin’s position.” The Prescriptions section presents various actions and initiatives to counter the Russian historical policy’s propaganda and distortions. As an example, “It would be worth setting up a Polish-Ukrainian team to monitor Russian disinformation in the area of the history of the two countries, which could include specially appointed experts. Such a group could also be formed through cooperation between Polish and Ukrainian think–tanks dealing with national security.”